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Monterey, California: U.S. Naval Postgraduate School

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THE CREATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT FOR
EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP


A SECOND LOOK AT GENERAL ORDER 21
WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED

by

LT John D. O'Kane, USN

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THE CREATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT FOR EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP

A SECOND LOOK AT GENERAL ORDER 21

WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED?

A Research Paper

Presented to

the Faculty of the Management School
U. S. Naval Postgraduate School

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Navy
Management Course

by

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January 1960

1986-10-22

662

McKane, T.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	1
I. PROBLEMS AND RESPONSIBILITIES	3
II. OUR PERSONNEL -- BACKGROUND AND PERFORMANCE	9
III. BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL ENLISTED	
PERSONNEL STUDIES	22
IV. COMMUNISM	30
V. WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED	34
VI. SUMMARY	43
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS	46
BIBLIOGRAPHY	49
SELECTED READINGS	50
APPENDIX A. Questionnaire Used	51
APPENDIX B. Comments Received	54

INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1958, there appeared in every ship and station in the U. S. Navy a document much like many others in its format and method of distribution and which probably received no more than passing attention at the time of its receipt. As a matter of fact, the then Secretary of the Navy Gates, on his return from an inspection of United States naval activities in the European area, including ships of the Sixth Fleet, asked some pointed questions of his topmost military assistants in the Navy Department. Mr. Gates had found, with only few exceptions, that this document, General Order 21, had in fact been read by only a few naval officers and, by and large, had been seen only by the yeoman who had opened the mail and had ultimately placed it in the ship's files! What was there about this particular general order which would so set it apart from other general orders as to make it worthy of follow-up attention by the Secretary of the Navy? Let's break it out and take a second look!

The first thing one notices is its brevity -- only ten short paragraphs on 1-1/4 pages. Its title, "Naval Leadership" -- certainly nothing startling in that. Possibly just another of the countless hundreds of other

pieces of paper which have been generated on the same subject down through the years. Yet, this one may be different after all, for in the text appear words not normally encountered in official naval directives.

"Moral character," "good management practices," "moral responsibility," "moral behavior," "moral atmosphere," and "management effectiveness," to name just a few. To the average career naval officer, steeped in the traditions of an organization whose guiding principles historically are synonymous with these very traits, a jarring note was struck on realizing that the topmost official of the Navy had seen fit to spell them out in this context -- not in a tale out of the romantic past in which the protagonist is shown to possess those virtues in the fullest measure, but rather in a general order in which they are listed as absolute necessities in the creation of an environment for effective leadership and, further, decrying their lack in the naval leaders of today.

It is the purpose, then, of this paper to explore into some of the reasons why General Order 21 was necessary and to determine in a general way what has been accomplished in the eighteen months which have elapsed since issue.

CHAPTER I

PROBLEMS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

It will be noted that a major portion of this paper deals with the general area of enlisted personnel of the Navy. Although done deliberately because of the obvious fact that enlisted personnel account for a major portion of our naval population, it is not in any way intended to minimize the role of the officer corps in the creation of the environment necessary for effective leadership. Indeed, Secretary Gates emphasizes this very point in his personal letter transmitting General Order 21 to all commanding officers when he says "The most successful programs are those stemming directly from the interest and direction of line officers." (5, p.2)

What was General Order 21 intended to accomplish? Again citing Mr. Gates, "Personnel shortages make more important than ever the improved utilization of our manpower" and "The AWOL rate rose 30% in 1957 over 1956 and courts martial continue at a rate of 1,000 a week. The human and financial losses in terms of wasted manpower cannot be afforded, either by the Navy or by our country." (5, p.1)

Let us look at only a few of the problems (8, p.2) faced by the Navy today -- problems which in the main are

susceptible of correction by effective leadership at every level of command.

1. Every month enough men to man three squadrons of destroyers are in confinement.
2. Every month enough men to man a submarine squadron are being discharged from the Navy with Bad Conduct, Undesirable, and Dishonorable discharges.
3. During 1955, the cost of work not done because of AWOLism was \$100 million. This one hundred million dollars is not the cost of maintaining prisons, of courts martial, apprehending prisoners, etc. It is simply the cost of time lost from work.
Question: With the cost of training one pilot (pre-flight, basic, advanced: Pensacola) currently about \$90,000, how many pilots could be trained with this \$100 million wasted annually through time lost from work because of AWOLism?
4. In one week in Japan, 4 men died of overdose of pure heroin, sold them for 25¢ per "shot"; a ship returning from the Far East had to discharge 5 men from a crew of less than 300 for narcotic usage or traffic.
5. At least enough men to man more than five Forrestal-class carriers are hospitalized annually

for neuropsychiatric treatment.

6. What is the impact on our international relations of the continuing reports of the "ambassadors of America" staggering down the streets of the Riviera, or smashing barrooms in Naples, or tossing around foul language in Yokosuka -- all the result of excessive drunkenness?

The above are a few of our problems -- there are many others but this brief listing should suffice to establish generally the magnitude of the task confronting us as leaders.

It is submitted that neither moral nor military leadership can ultimately be supplied by written directives, enunciated principles, or training systems. Leadership of men is by men and it requires leaders. Admiral Burke has said, "Regardless of the technical advances already on the scientific horizon, regardless of the unlimited possibilities that are appearing in the atomic age, men with honorable purpose will remain the one essential ingredient to successful operations." (6,p.107)

Is there yet another side to the coin? Is the Navy inspired exclusively by the apparently selfish motive of getting the most out of the men available. Traditionally, the Navy has recognized its responsibility to the

whole man, with his individual dignity and full potential of personal worth and democratic citizenship. The Commandant, FIRST Naval District, in his Instruction 1743.1, says it this way:

Large numbers of young men are currently entering the Navy, who, except for the partial mobilization due to world conditions, would probably remain for several years within the sphere of influence of their homes, where they would receive valuable guidance in moral and spiritual standards. In addition, the increasing tempo and commercialization of our American pattern of life, as well as deliberate, subversive influences, have lessened the value of the home and the schools as mediums for inculcating in youth moral restraint and behavior. In many areas, our youth is not being grounded in the moral restraints, spiritual values, behavior codes, and habits of industry that were responsible for our becoming a great nation and are indispensable to our very survival. To all categories of young men joining the Navy, therefore, the Navy itself must act in loco parentis. We must strive to develop and maintain among these young bluejackets a high moral tone and standards of character and behavior. We must instill in them habits of industry, thrift, loyalty, and pride of citizenship. Whether they make the Navy a career or not, it must be our goal to make them better men and better citizens for having served in the United States Navy.

We come, then, to the realization that our obligation as leaders is a dual one -- not alone to the Navy but to the civilian community as well. To whom do we turn, on whom does the responsibility for the discharge of this obligation lie? There can be but one basic answer: the officer corps of the Navy. Through his prescribed military functions, many of which are intimately

connected with the needs, aspirations, and satisfactions of his men, the Navy officer is likely to become a significant and meaningful, and hence imitable person to his followers, whether he desires such result or not. Hence his personal behavior must reflect the moral principles which a program of moral leadership is to uphold. If the officer has not sorted out his own moral values to conform with what is objectively good and worthwhile; if he has not brought his behaviors into correlation with values to which he subscribes intellectually; if he is morally disorganized and immature himself, he is obviously not qualified for moral leadership of others. The development of mature character in himself and its facilitation in his followers is a logical and prescribed leadership responsibility which the Navy officer undertakes in accepting his commission. Regardless of his own personal motivation toward a naval career, whether he intends serving only the minimum time required by law or the maximum time permitted by law, his responsibility in this regard is inescapable from the moment he dons the blue suit.

Having taken an extremely brief look at some of the conditions General Order 21 is aimed at correcting, and at the responsibility of the naval officer in the

execution of its terms, let us now examine briefly the naval population with which we must work -- who it is, what it is made up of, where does it come from?

CHAPTER II

OUR PERSONNEL -- BACKGROUND AND PERFORMANCE

Keeping in mind that the intended audience of this paper is composed in the main of professional military officers, it might be well to try and set this subject matter in a perspective familiar to us all. The following article, the more impressive for its having been written not by a fellow officer but by some anonymous editorial writer, appeared in the Wall Street Journal for 14 May 1952. While probably no better than many other similar treatings of this subject, the fact remains that it was originated outside the military. It conveys accurately and adequately the Navy officer's concepts of leadership, and its inter-related components of authority, responsibility, and accountability. The editorial was occasioned by the convening of a board of investigation following the tragic collision of USS HOBSON and USS WASP.

One night past some 30,000 tons of ships went hurtling at each other through the darkness. When they had met, 2,000 tons of ship and 176 men lay at the bottom of the sea in a far off place.

Now comes the cruel business of accountability. Those who were there, those who are left from those who were there, must answer how it happened and whose was the error that made it happen.

It is a cruel business because it was no wish of destruction that killed this ship and its 176 men; the accountability lies with good men who erred in judgment under stress so great that it is almost im-

own excuse. Cruel, because no matter how deep the probe, it cannot change the dead, because it cannot probe deeper than remorse.

And it seems more cruel still, because all around us in other places we see the plea accepted that what is done is done beyond discussion, and that for good men in their human errors there should be afterwards no accountability.....

Everywhere else we are told how inhuman it is to submit men to the ordeal of answering for themselves. To haul them before committees and badger them with questions as to where they were and what they were doing while the ship of state careened from one course to another.

This probing into the sea seems more merciless because almost everywhere else we have abandoned accountability. What is done is done and why torture men with asking them afterwards, why?.....

We are told men should no longer be held accountable for what they do as well as for what they intend. To err is not only human, it absolves responsibility.

Everywhere, that is, except on the sea. On the sea there is a tradition older even than the traditions of the country itself and wiser in its age than this new custom. It is the tradition that with responsibility goes authority and with them both goes accountability. (Emphasis supplied.)

This accountability is not for the intentions but for the deed. The captain of a ship, like the captain of a state, is given honor and privileges and trust beyond other men. But let him set the wrong course, let him touch ground, let him bring disaster to his ship or to his men, and he must answer for what he has done. No matter what, he cannot escape.

It is cruel, this accountability of good and well-intentioned men. But the choice is that or an end to responsibility and finally, as the cruel sea has taught, an end to the confidence and trust in the men who lead, for men will not long trust leaders who feel themselves beyond accountability for what they do.

And when men lose confidence and trust in those who lead, order disintegrates into chaos and purposeful ships into uncontrollable derelicts. (9, p.155)


It can readily be seen that the sense of this

oditorial, although inspired by the collision of two Navy ships, is aimed at the civilian community of the newspaper's readers. The self-same civilian community from which is drawn the men and women that make up the U. S. Navy. We in the Navy get the products of this civilian community when they are about 17, or 18, or a little older. In other words, their formative years have been spent in an atmosphere which apparently subscribes to the ill-founded theories which prompted the Wall Street Journal's rather thinly veiled indictment. It might be said that we in the Navy reap the fruit of the seed sown in civilian life. Let us, then, take a look at what was happening to our people in the 17 or more years before they came to us, what or where they wore, and what sort of lives are normal in our civilian communities.

In attempting to assess relative importance of various factors making up a composite picture of the life of the average United States civilian, certainly great importance would have to attach to the home, the church, and the schools as having been major influences in the development of the country. From material used in the Leadership and Administration courses given at the Navy's General Line School it is learned that, in 1870, 1 out of 33.7 marriages ended in divorce. The United States

currently "enjoys" a divorce ratio of 1 out of every 2 to 3 marriages. One hastens to add that we are not here concerned with the morality of divorce; rather, we are more interested in the relative instability of the children of those marriages as compared with those of the 1870's. Is it significant that, out of some 45 million children in America today, about 12 million live either with only one of their parents or in an institution and that the divorce rate is producing broken home situations for children at the rate of 150,000 per year? It is of major significance when it is learned that, at one Navy Retraining Command, a 5-year survey of its confinees indicated that 82% of them came from broken homes -- where marriage had been disrupted by death, divorce, or separation. (8, p.5 et seq)

What about church? Admittedly a strong influence for good in our national life, it must be agreed that the most powerful and most direct influence of any church is upon those who attend. Pointing up the fact that there are millions of American people who belong to no church or who attend only rarely, and that 96% of the American people believe in God, a recent poll revealed that only 1 person out of 100 could answer correctly 10 rudimentary questions, questions such as "Who preached the Sermon on



the Mount?" Even among college-trained people, only 6 out of the 10 questions were answered correctly by a majority. A recent FBI survey of 8,000 cases of arrest for juvenile delinquency indicated that only 40 of the children arrested ever attended church regularly, and that, out of the entire 8,000, not a single one of their parents ever attended church. (8,p.6)

With regard to our schools, where discipline traditionally was of prime importance, another recent survey showed that 65% of our parents felt that discipline in modern American schools is not strict enough.

The foregoing should not be construed as in any way inferring that the American home, school, or church, have ceased to be effective as wholesome influences; to the contrary, they remain dominantly effective. It is simply intended that one recognize that changes have taken place.

Let us look now at some other factors which have a bearing on the shaping of our American youth prior to their entering military service.

A look at the Uniform Crime Report reveals that, between 1950 and 1955, while the population of the entire United States was increasing by 7%, the increase in crime for those years was 26.7% -- almost 4 times as great.

During 1956, 1 major crime was committed every 12.2 seconds. Major crimes registered a 21.3% increase in 1956 and included 55 rapes and 37 murders every day. In that year, the major crime rate passed the 2-1/2 million mark and was the fifth consecutive year in which the rate was over 2 million. Now, what degree of involvement in these figures is represented by juveniles -- those 18 years of age or younger? (8,p.6)

We find that, in 1955, 42 of every 100 major crimes were committed by those 18 or younger; of perhaps even greater significance to we in the Navy is the fact that 21 out of every 100 major crimes were committed by those 14 years of age or younger. In the 14 or younger age group, those who are today coming of age for military service, we find the following sobering facts for year 1955:

Major crime that year increased by 12%. Children were arrested for 21,141 major thefts, 4,211 auto thefts, 12,384 burglaries. 542 were arrested for drunkenness, 12 for drunken driving, 84 for embezzlement, 95 for forgery, 163 for rape, 23 for professional prostitution, and 22 for murder. (8,p.7)

We have all heard much lately of the apparent increase in popularity of the "the world owes me a living" philosophy. One wonders if the social environment in which today's American youth is growing up, the



unprecedented prosperity, the need for manpower, the ever-increasing opportunities available for youth, whether or not this philosophy is being fostered by exactly those apparently favorable conditions. Of course, one is constrained to add that there is here no implication that the Navy today is being inundated by a flood of rapists, murderers, and thieves -- rather only is it desired to arouse speculation as to the possible effect a social climate or environment which creates this type of citizen might have on those apparently untainted and being accepted into the military.

Now, in order not to damn completely only the teenagers of today, let us go back a few years and examine, on the basis of actual performance what the product of an earlier day did when exposed to the pressures of the communist prisoner-of-war camps in the Korean action. By now, the shocking facts reported by the Army's Lieutenant Colonel W. E. Mayer, a psychiatrist who was closely associated with programs for repatriation and rehabilitation of our POW's from inception are so well known as to render needless any detailed treatment here. Suffice it, then, to consider only briefly how these men, the product of the 1930's, most of whom did their growing up during the years of World War II and shortly thereafter, stood

up under the treatment of their captors. Consider for a moment that, for the first time in our country's history, not a single American prisoner escaped from an enemy prison camp during the entire Korean action (4,p.16); that our POW's sustained a higher death rate (about 38%) in captivity than in any previous war including the Revolution (about 33%) (4,p.17); and this despite a significant body of evidence indicating its attributability not to communist maltreatment but to ignorance or callousness among the prisoners themselves (4,p.17); that, in a particular group of 4,000 American POW's, about 1 out of every 3 was guilty of collaboration with the enemy in some degree, be it writing anti-American propaganda or informing on comrades, and even extending in some cases to outright murder of fellow prisoners. (4,p.16) Consider further that, only four days after our forces first engaged the enemy in Korea, an American Army officer who had been in communist custody for some 48 hours, made a 900-word broadcast in the enemy's behalf over the Seoul radio. (4,p.18) Doctor Mayer, in analyzing the causes of this breakdown of personal and military discipline, writes of the basic defect as lying in three areas:

First, in the area of character development and the development within young people of an internalized system of discipline.

Second, in the area of general education, particularly education about the American democracy -- which, I think, has suffered at the hands of those who cry havoc at any hint of what they choose to label "nationalism."

Third, in the area of military preparedness, which in the minds of a great many people resolves itself simply into a problem of mechanics, ballistics, push buttons and guided missiles rather than emphasizing the moral and characterological elements in war. (6,p.15)

This, then, is a rough picture of the performance of the end-product of inadequate citizen-training in one situation.

So much, then, for the relatively recent past. Let us now turn our attention even further back in our history and consider briefly a Navy which could have prompted the writing of a paper entitled "Bureaucracy in the Navy." (3,p.347) The author, Arthur K. Davis, served for three years in the Naval Reserve during World War II as an Air Combat Intelligence Officer, was a product of the Quonset Point Officers Indoctrination School, and served in two Fleet Air Wings. While readily admitting that Davis' views could arise from a purely localized view of conditions in a specific command, it should be borne in mind that he was a trained and mature sociologist before coming on active duty. It is entirely possible that his views on the naval social organization are valid when considered in the light of his presumed analytical

skills in this area. Further, Davis' observations are confined exclusively to the officer corps of the Navy. "Observations are limited to four aspects of naval social organization: (1) the tendency to avoid responsibility; (2) legalism; (3) the Navy as an insulated occupation; (4) ceremonialism." (3,p.348) In treating of the first of these, under the heading of "Avoiding responsibility: the philosophy of do-the-least" the author submits and develops five propositions:

1. Shunting responsibility upward stems partly from the universal fact that a functionary's area of responsibility invariably exceeds that of his control.

2. A second incentive for buck-passing is the latent conflict between authority and specialization.

3. Bureaucracies often develop an esprit de corps which congeals individual initiative.

4. Structuralized discrepancies between individual effort and reward in military systems restrain initiative in both war and peace, though for different reasons.

5. The unofficial conception of a Regular Navy career often minimizes assumption of responsibility.
(3,pp 352-354)

With regard to "Legalism: the psychology of



affirm-and-conform" Davis sums up by saying

Combining legalism and avoidance of unnecessary responsibility, we arrive at the golden rule for the professional military career: "Follow the book or pass the buck." (3,pp 355-356)

Developing the aspect of "The Navy as an insulated occupation" Davis mentions the tendency for Navy families to hold themselves aloof from the community in which they happen to reside, their tendency for flocking together because of common ties, the non-political tradition of the American military, the formalized social and ritual activities, and the tendency toward development of parochialism induced by the strong *esprit de corps*. Davis mentions in passing the possibility of distinctive patterns of sexual behavior among naval personnel, their wives and juniors, but which possibility could not be developed for lack of systematic evidence on "this important point." (3,pp 356-358)

As for "Ceremonialism: the conspicuous consumption of military systems" ritual is likened to the golden calf of a military system whose sacred cow is regulation. Having apparently had a connection with the processing of awards in his command, the author mentions the "strike-flight" system of "automatic" award of the Air Medal and the Distinguished Flying Cross. In addition, on the subject of awards, he has this to say:

A chestful of ribbons does not mean that the wearer is a super-hero. (Note: In a footnote qualification, Davis indicates the possibility the wearer may indeed be a super-hero but his opinion is that this is very unlikely.) It is an infallible sign of only one fact -- that he is a high-ranking Regular Navy officer. Regular officers received a greater proportion of awards than Reservists did, and officers in general were favored over enlisted men. (3, pp 358-359)

The foregoing article appeared in the periodical "Social Forces" for December, 1948, and has been reprinted and included in an authoritative text in the field of human relations. With all due deference to the author's academic qualifications and assuming he was simply reporting facts as he knew them, this writer is forced to the conclusion that a most curious organization must have existed in the commands to which Davis was attached. While not in the least agreeing with the bulk of the ideas and theories he advances, one is nonetheless unable to dismiss his writings as those of another of the disgruntled self-styled military "experts" whose outpourings flooded the American literary scene in the postwar years. Rather, one cannot but speculate on the system -- what is there in our "way" which would cause a professional sociologist to build a treatise on bureaucracy around facts such as those? The picture painted by Davis certainly differs sharply from that of our Wall Street Journal editorial



writer and his assessment of accountability as an integral part of authority and responsibility in those who follow the sca.

CHAPTER III

BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL ENLISTED PERSONNEL STUDIES

Thus far, we have been dealing mainly with a few of the more general areas which, in aggregate, culminated in the issuance of General Order 21 and its exhortation to develop and improve our naval leadership. In the previously cited personal letter to all commanding officers, Secretary Gates said

Personnel shortages make more important than ever the improved utilization of our manpower. In this era of advanced technology we tend to lose sight of the man behind the missile

and

Many of our problems can be resolved with leadership, better personnel management, and a sincere evaluation of basic moral standards. (5)

Compare, for a moment, Secretary Gates' words with those:

Never, I think, in the history of our Navy has leadership been so necessary a quality for the young officer as today. The general feeling of unrest throughout the world, the shaking of faith in old beliefs and in the established order of things, the spirit, not exactly of Bolshevism but of discontent with our own position and rewards, all are reflected more or less among us in the naval service.

Or

Too often nowadays one finds a young officer sitting in the wardroom and growling about the shortcomings of the enlisted personnel he has to deal with.

The latter two quotations were taken from an essay on leadership, written by a Commander R. C. Parker, USN, thirty-nine years ago, in 1920! The article was reproduced by Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet on 19 August

1958 and is commended in its entirety (2) to the attention of those of today's naval officers who feel they are the victims of a recent deterioration of our American society or who think of the current efforts toward improvement of naval leadership as "just another program."

From all the foregoing, it would appear that the Navy does, indeed, have a problem. Let us now examine what we know about our Navy enlisted population of today. Recent studies made by the Bureau of Naval Personnel (8, addendum, pp 1-12) have developed the following interesting facts (Complete copies of these studies and supporting work sheets are available on request from the Bureau (Pers-F52) for further exploration of findings and conclusions therein discussed.):

1. About 70% of all naval personnel have no record of disciplinary action against them.
2. An additional 13% or so have only one punishment of record.
3. The current disciplinary problem group (3 or more offenses of record) involves only about 8-1/2% of the whole Navy (about 50,000 men). This does not include the considerable past records possessed by some 12% of the petty officers (about 60,000 men).
4. Possession of considerable records (over 1



offense) by about 12% of all petty officers (or about 60,000 men) indicates that first cruise disciplinary infractions are neither a bar to ultimate career success nor necessarily a mark of unsuitability for a naval career. However, those 60,000 petty officers represent career spans of 3 to 22 years whereas the current problem group of about 50,000 have become problems largely within 1 to 3 years. There is, therefore, a *prima facie* case that the Navy can dispense with most of the latter group, particularly in view of the certain other unsuitable group characteristics following.

5. Over 75% of all offenses recorded were committed by men of tenth grade or less education although these are only about 45% of the whole Navy.

6. Over 55% of all offenses were committed by men of GCT 45 or below who are only about 36% of the whole Navy.

7. Men of age 23 and under who are nearly 2/3 of the Navy include about 50,000 in the problem group which accounted for 44.5% of all offenses studied.

8. A subgroup termed "non-select" of low GCT (45 and below), limited education (11th grade or less), and young age (22 and below), which accounts for

20% of current enlisted strength, or about 120,000 men, contains about half, or around 25,000, of the current repeated disciplinary offenders. This is about 1 man in 5 who is an offender at least once. This nucleus of the current disciplinary problem represents only about 4 to 5% of naval enlisted strength and, because of deficient education and limited learning power, has few compensatory attributes.

9. Conversely, of the more or less select young men (near high school graduates or better, GCT 46 and above, but ages 22 and below) who are probably about 45% of current strength or about 285,000 men, only 1 in every 11 or 12 is ever a disciplinary offender.

Some of the more significant factors in these studies, then, may be summarized as follows:

1. The number of years schooling completed prior to first enlistment appears of great significance in estimating an individual's capability for a successful naval career. High school graduates and 11th graders make good naval bodies, for these produce nearly 60% of all petty officers, only 24% of the offenders, and comprise about 55% of naval enlisted



personnel. Men of 10th grade or less education make poor or fair naval bodies, for these produce only about 40% of the petty officers, about 75% of the military offenders and account for only 45% of total enlisted strength.

- a. Years schooling completed is very meaningful. Individuals of grammar school or less education (about 15-1/2% of the Navy) furnish nearly 40% of all military offenders of record.
- b. Limited education appears to relate to low GCT to a degree. Individuals of low GCT tend to leave school earlier.

c. Well over one-half of the individuals of limited education in the Navy join at age 17 and this same group furnishes 60% of all military offenders.

d. Although in this study petty officer status is arbitrarily used as a measure of career success, this is not an entirely sound assumption. The FO1 and FO2 grades contain over 50% individuals of limited education of whom about half have considerable military disciplinary records. Various tabulations in these studies show that most of the very worst cumulative records

are by men in these pay grades. This may be indicative of less than entirely desirable character in upwards of one-fourth of the men in these pay grades.

2. Age on first enlistment appears a very significant factor in estimating career success. Individuals enlisting at age 17 often do so in consequence of school failure, not necessarily arising from intellectual inadequacy. These men furnish proportionately fewer good petty officers and far too many military offenders.

3. GCT score is NOT, either by itself or in conjunction with other factors, of any use as an indication of capability for conforming to naval discipline. About equal proportions of men of high and low GCT appear as military offenders in all disciplinary subgroups.

a. GCT score IS, where the individual has a limited education, 10 years or less schooling, of considerable use in predicting petty officer successes despite limited education and low GCT (45 and below).

b. Men of high GCT have a good chance of career success. Nearly 80% of all petty officers



are in this group versus 55% of all enlisted personnel. But if they leave school too soon, many of them (one-third) become disciplinary problems.

c. Men of low GCT have limited chances of a petty officer career. The 15% of low GCT and limited education who are petty officers includes many World War II petty officers who could not attain their grade under current standards, or many individuals who have at least two disciplinary offenses of record, or, many individuals who break down under stress late in their careers (13 to 18 years) due to intellectual and educational inadequacy, becoming alcoholics, neuropsychiatric or other medical problems, chronic debtors or, on occasion, major offenders.


4. With regard to the so-called "Debtors" the survey shows that nearly 70% are deficient in education (10th grade or less) and of lower half in mental grouping. About half are petty officers and over half have six or more years service. 70% are married, with children. Over one-third of all serious indebtedness occurs in three rating groups, viz: Cook, Supply, and Steward -- rates requiring minimal

educational and intelectual qualification.

5. As regards homosexuals, the survey shows they seldom have any significant disciplinary record, that they occur disproportionately in certain rating groups to which they are apparently attracted by the nature of the work, interpersonal relationships and opportunity for privacy and freedom from supervision, and that they share no particular ready identification characteristics.

NOTE: IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT THE FOREGOING FIGURES WERE COMPILED FROM A SAMPLING OF PERSONNEL ONLY AND THAT THE PROPER STATISTICAL ANALYSIS TO RENDER THEM OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY HAS NOT BEEN CONDUCTED.

THE REPORT FROM WHICH DRAWN IS NOT OFFICIAL.



CHAPTER IV

COMMUNISM

This, then, is an extremely limited look at our Navy of today -- the men drawn from that civilian community which our editorial writer says "has abandoned accountability." It is their counterparts of whom Dr. Mayer has written concerning their self-discipline and rejection of authority in the communist prisoner of war camps in Korea:

Soldiers in the most difficult, early days of captivity, in a great many cases, evidently struck out for themselves, so to speak, simply because of a failure to understand that only by a community effort among them would the largest number survive. Some prisoners talked about a "dog eat dog" attitude, and "every man for himself" kind of behavior. Prisoners talked about this quite a bit, to the effect that, if a man started to get sick, the chances were that his fellow soldiers would, for all practical purposes, abandon him, partly in the expectation that he was bound to die anyway, and partly because they were just too busy taking care of themselves. . . .

When I talk about discipline, I am not talking about externally imposed rules, punishments, and regulations. The kind of discipline that makes it possible to maintain an organized group working for the welfare of each member of this group is, and has to be, an internalized discipline on the part of each individual, a self-discipline, which can't be just an automatic, externally imposed set of values. . . . they were confronted in the camps with an interesting and rather new phenomenon. This was an attitude among great numbers of prisoners that when they became prisoners they somehow ceased to be soldiers and, along with this, were relieved of any responsibility to follow designated leaders or to meet any of the ordinary requirements of being a soldier. (They rejected authority) not

only their officers' but their non-commissioned officers' and also those among them who attempted to exercise leadership and establish organization. (6, pp 13-14)

Contrast this performance, for a moment, with that of the Turkish POW's. From Kinkead (4) we learn that, although almost half of the Turkish prisoners were wounded when captured, not a single one died in captivity. The secret of their "astonishing record" is said to be the strict discipline they maintained while in custody. By preserving their chain of command unbroken they were able to present a united front to the pressures of communist indoctrination, even though the men and their officers were segregated like the rest of the prisoners. One Turkish officer, being interrogated by an American investigator, is quoted as saying:

I told the Chinese commander of the camp that while we were a unit, I was in charge of my group. If he wanted anything done, he was to come to me, and I would see that it was done. When he removed me, the responsibility would fall not on him, but on the man next below me, and after that on the man below him. And so on, down through the ranks, until there were only two privates left. Then the senior private would be in charge. They could kill us, I told him, but they couldn't make us do what we didn't want to do. Discipline was our salvation, and we all knew it. If a Turk had responded to an order from his superiors to share his food or lift a litter the way I understand some of your men did, he would literally have had his teeth knocked in. Not by his superior, either, but by the Turk nearest to him. (4, p 166)

men. You have been chosen for an opportunity not accorded to all men. Your word carries a lot of influence. If you know what is true and real, then you can lead properly. (1)

CHAPTER V

WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED

It has been the purpose of this necessarily cursory treatment of the general subject of the social climate of our country today and of our military today to explain why it was necessary to "blow the whistle" on us; why it had become imperative that we of the Navy get off the dime and begin doing something besides giving mere lip service to our traditions of integrity, character, and devotion to duty and to country. In short, why General Order 21 was issued.

General Order 21 has now been in the hands of the Fleet for some eighteen months. It has been implemented and supplemented by a myriad of instructions and directives at every level of command. Prior to attending the present course of instruction, this writer served in a ship, a submarine tender, which was among the first of the ships of the Pacific Fleet to institute a formalized program in support of General Order 21. Our approach contained nothing unique or startling; there was no attendant hullabaloo on its inception. With a few isolated exceptions, the only materials used were the Leadership Discussion Guides furnished by the Bureau of Naval Personnel. The general policies of the ship were changed only in minor cases (e.g., the meaningless office

of "police petty officer" was abolished as one way of demonstrating that the authority and prestige of a particular "duty" petty officer lay not in the tin badge he happened to be wearing every third day but rather in the rating badge he wore on his arm. The latter, unlike the PPO badge, could not be removed at will and passed around among members of the duty section as the fancy of the moment dictated --- the authority and responsibility attached to the individual by virtue of his inherent status and rank and not because he happened to be wearing a badge.). A determined effort was made to place decision making authority at as low a level in the ship's organization as was feasible. Petty officers were exposed to the concept that, in addition to the authority represented by their rating badges, they also had responsibility and they would be held accountable for that responsibility. In addition, and to the maximum extent practicable in the face of a chronic shortage of personnel, certain privileges and perquisites corresponding to their respective offices were extended. As might be expected, there was the normal amount of "It'll never work" response in the ship's company when the program first made itself felt. The very nature of the ship's mission, requiring as it does that an underway period be the exception rather than the rule,

was a further complication. It is axiomatic in the Navy that the one and only place to knit together a ship's company into a cohesive, disciplined, and knowledgeable organization is out at sea -- not sitting in the harbor of a large metropolitan area where duty in a ship such as this becomes very similar to a civilian job. It must be admitted that, as sea duty goes, duty in a submarine tender makes pretty good shore duty! In any case, when this writer left the ship in July, 1959, the program having then been in effect for some 13 months, the lesson to be learned was apparent to all. The program really works if those applying it will only work at making it work. Our reenlistment rate, both career and first cruise, was on the way up; our mast and court martial rate was headed down and at a significantly satisfying pace; our petty officers were taking evident pride and satisfaction at their enhanced position in the hierarchy, and a "crow" was beginning to mean something besides an indicated level of technical proficiency in a particular specialty.

So, with this background of knowledge, it was considered appropriate in connection with the production of this paper to try and establish what has been done in the Pacific Fleet in general -- not only what has been done but, more important, what has been

accomplished?

A questionnaire, copy of which is attached as Appendix A, was sent to various ships of the Pacific Fleet. The list included large combatants (CV & CA), small combatants (DD, DE, & SS), amphibious types (AKA & LST), and other deep draft auxiliaries (AD, AO, & AR). Names of ships were chosen at random from the respective portions of the Standard Navy Distribution List. Forty-eight ships were interrogated; 36 replies were received. In the case of those ships which did not reply, it is reasonable to assume that some people just don't answer questionnaires, or that they do not have programs and don't wish to go on record to that effect, or that there was a breakdown in the communications. Inasmuch as the questionnaire was intended to produce, not exact figures but rather, impressions or opinions of those responsible for prosecuting the various programs, the answers do not lend themselves to a strict statistical analysis. For this reason, the questions and answers will be treated only in general terms.

Question #1: As would be expected, the majority show their on-board strength to be below allowance and generally at Fleet Manning Level. The only "soft" area noted as being consistently below the

Manning Level is that of PO2 and PO3.

Question #2: Coincidentally, replies were received from deploying ships with only one exception. The expected modal distribution of 9 months in home port, 6 months deployed, and 3 months overhaul time was encountered. The time spent in home port included a range of from 3 to 14 months; time deployed showed a range of from 2 to 12 months; overhaul time varied from 0 to 5 months.

Question #3: Four ships reported no programs, either now or in the past. One declined to answer and returned the questionnaire blank.

Question #4: Admittedly a poor question in that what is "formal" to one may well be "informal" to another. It was worded this way in an effort to find out how the various programs were regarded by those administering them. By far, the programs reported were classified as "informal."

Question #5: Three ships reported completion of programs which lasted for two, five, and eleven months respectively. The remainder reported their programs as "continuing" with the length of time in effect varying from a low of 4 months (3 ships) to a high of 18 months (2 ships). One reported having

had a program for 36 months, apparently choosing to count time invested in the original Moral Standards and Character Education Program which antedated General Order 21. The modal figure for program duration was 5 months and 12 months.

Question #6: With only three exceptions, the "standard" method as outlined in the question was reported in use. One exception indicated heavy reliance on outside "Leadership Teams" with no mention of special shipboard effort other than an inference the ship is operated so as to live the precepts of the general order. Another indicates the existence of an Enlisted Leadership Council made up of "outstanding PO's from each Department and headed by the Executive Officer and Ship's Operations Officer." Apparently meeting on an irregular basis, the Council considers items developed either by itself or the Commanding Officer and makes recommendations for improvement; also, individual members perform preliminary investigation of offenses committed within respective departments and make recommendations as to what disciplinary action should be taken. The third ship, with a "formal continuing" program is simply operated so as to insure compliance with the

precepts of the general order.

Question #7: In only one case was the comment on the Guides adverse ("Too technical. Need general subheads and discussion topics rather than present detailed write-up"). Two ships reported their not using the Guides; one restricting their use to officer reading only and the other preferring "formal lectures by trained teams." The "other" materials most frequently mentioned as used were the tape recordings of Dr. Mayer's talks and the training film "The Challenge of General Order 21."

Question #8:

a. Mast Cases:- By a majority of almost 2 to 1, trend reported as down.

b. Courts Martial:- Trend solidly down; two ships reported an increase. One of these completed a 5-month program last February and, oddly enough, the other was one of two having had a program in effect for 18 months.

c. Indebtsdness:- No appreciable change, with a solid majority reporting trend as level. Three ships, all with programs in effect, reported an increase.

d. Reenlistment:- An even split between reports

of level and upward trends. Of four ships reporting downward trends, two completed 2-month and 5-month programs respectively; the other two have had programs for 18 and 4 months, respectively.

e. Petty officer prestige:- Admittedly a difficult one to assess. Reports indicate an upward trend by a slim margin with an unchanging level reported as a close second.

f. Operational performance:- By a majority of about 3 to 2, reports of an upward trend lead over those of a level trend. The ship with the completed 2-month program reports a downward trend.

g. Miscellaneous:- There were two reports of an upward trend in the area of administrative discharges (possibly due to the 41-and-under GCT discharge policy which became effective during this period), and morale; a downward trend in the area of unauthorized absence was reported by one ship.

Question #9: A surprisingly large number of ships reported no inspections during the past 18 months; however, those reporting inspections were unanimous

in their opinion that the program itself probably did not appreciably affect the grades assigned; the majority of the comments indicated the inspections either to have been completed prior to institution of their programs or that the programs had been in effect too short a time to have affected the grade.

Question #10: Such comments as were made are reproduced in their entirety and attached hereto as Appendix B.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY

It is disappointing that the results of this informal opinion survey are not indicative of a marked improvement in the Fleet. Some consolation may be taken from the progress which has been made and that, in view of the large numbers of unchanging trends reported, we at least haven't lost anything for our efforts. It seems, however, that a danger may exist in this type of rationalization in that we may in fact only be perpetuating mediocrity.

Again realizing that General Order 21 has been in the hands of the Navy for some 18 months what do we find? Over 11% of the ships interrogated have no programs in effect. Is it reasonable to conclude that this percentage might accurately reflect the performance of the entire Pacific Fleet or of the entire Navy? Over 33% of the ships interrogated have had their programs in effect for 6 months or less. Does it take a full year for one-third of the Fleet to comply with a general order? Of the three ships reporting "completed" programs, two were large combatants and the other a deep draft auxiliary -- types normally commanded by relatively senior captains. From the writer's personal experience and from the intent of the program as envisioned by the Bureau of Naval

Personnel, it is known that it is impossible to do much more than get a program instituted in two months, let alone complete one.

It would be convenient and conventional to dismiss the discouraging reports by saying the survey took place about a year too soon. However, to do this, one would also have to dismiss the most disturbing aspect of the survey -- the comments made concerning the program. The methods of application, the attitudes, the sincerity of the officers and, more important, the evident distrust of the program, all these play an important role that time alone may not solve. (One hastens to add that, there being evidence of authorship on only a few of the statements, the sentiments expressed therein may not necessarily reflect those of the commanding officer of the particular ship. However, there is sufficient evidence of authenticity as to lead a reasonable person to conclude that the comments were at least made by officers, irrespective of rank or billet.) It is reasonably concluded, then, that in addition to a considerable lack of acceptance of the program in the Fleet, there exists also something less than complete understanding. If the officers themselves do not understand the importance of the program, and parenthetically it might be noted that these

very ships reported sagging reenlistment ratios and shortages of personnel, how then is the program ever going to get off the ground?

Of considerable cheer are the fine statements of support made by many. More again it is apparent that, by and large, the majority of our officers are sincerely trying to do the right thing; it is only in the area of the needed uniformity of approach that the reluctant minority is causing the program to short-circuit.

CHAPTER VII

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That a survey similar to this one be made at about this same point in time during 1960.
2. Recognizing that, in the military, one never issues an order saying "comply with my order" and that some other way must be found to accomplish the purpose, that immediate steps be taken to insure the presence in every ship and station of the Navy an actively functioning program in support of General Order 21.
3. That the U. S. Navy increase its efforts in the area of educating its personnel as to the nature of communism. To this end, the following are recommended for accomplishment as matters of urgency:
 - a. For enlisted personnel, the development of a training course in this vital area. Satisfactory completion of such a course should be made a mandatory requirement for all personnel competing for advancement to pay grade E-4, and a more advanced form of course, containing matter suitable for providing guidance in the conduct of guided discussions of the subject matter, be developed and made mandatory for those personnel competing for advancement to pay grade E-6.

b. For officers, a correspondence course in this area be developed and made mandatory for promotion above the rank of ensign. A similar and more advanced course should be required of officers as a prerequisite to promotion to the grade of lieutenant commander.

c. That, in the expanded curriculum of the Navy Management School, a separate course in International Affairs be established. This course to provide intensive instruction at the hands of trained educators in the area of understanding the threat of communism.


4. Again in the area of combatting communism through education, the U. S. Navy take the lead in the education of the civilian populace. It is considered that an organization to accomplish this task lies ready at hand in the membership of the Navy League, the Fleet Reserve Association, and members of the Naval Reserve. The Navy has the friendly ear of countless thousands of citizens of the civilian community, many of whom are of the stature needed to make an effort such as this succeed. It is recognized that this subject would have to be handled at the highest levels of Navy command and that considerable preliminary groundwork would have to be laid

in order to minimize possible misconception or misunderstanding through distortion of the facts.

5. In order to insure uniformity of subject matter, the Chief of Naval Personnel develop the "training in organization and administration" desired by Secretary Gates (5, p 2) for both officers and enlisted personnel. It is considered that this, too, would properly be the subject of training and correspondence courses of appropriate levels for those who are unable to acquire such training by formal means.

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APPENDIX A

77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88

8. In terms of ~~before~~ allowance of sacrifice 1000 hours, the number, count of personnel in this ship 18 months ago was as follows indicated: (check appropriate lines)

Category	Below	At	Above	Category	Below	At	Above
80 & 80+				80 & 80+			
Below				80 & 80+			
At				80 & 80+			
In Excess				80 & 80+			
80 & 80+				80 & 80+			
Below				80 & 80+			
At				80 & 80+			
In Excess				80 & 80+			
Over-all				80 & 80+			
Below				80 & 80+			
At				80 & 80+			
In Excess				80 & 80+			

9. During the past 18 months, this ship has spent approximately the number of months shown in indicated categories:

Operating out of home port 180
Operating away from home port (WestInd, etc) 180
Third overhaul, conversion, FUA, etc 180

10. Does your ship now have or has it ever had an active program in support of General Order #21? Yes No

NOTE: If answer to #9 above is "No" disregard remainder of questionnaire and return to sender.

11. Please categorize your program into one of the following:

Formal, continuing	<input type="checkbox"/>
Formal, completed	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informal, continuing	<input type="checkbox"/>
Informal, completed	<input type="checkbox"/>

12. If your program is continuing, approximately how long has it been in effect?

13. If your program is completed, over approximately how long a period of time did it extend? 180
Indicate approximate date completed.

14. The "standard" method of approach to the program is for the exec to oversee the actual mechanics of the program, committee, consulting, etc. The commanding officer, in turn, has a guided discussion among the exec and members of the board. Decisions are then held between commanding officer and chairman of the board, between chairman of the board and members of the board, between chairman of the board and commanding officer, between commanding officer and executive officer, between executive officer and members of the board.

15. Your program recently implemented what kind of a new or revised measure during the last 12 months?

156 "Please comment briefly on their adequacy:

6. Did you use other materials - on as training films, objects, etc? If so, list.
If "No" please specify what was used.

7. In the following areas, would you say the trend in your ship has been up (increase), down (decrease), or level during the past 18 months?

Up Down Level

6. Number of court cases	INCREASED	DECREASED	ABOUT SAME
7. Number of courts martial	INCREASED	DECREASED	ABOUT SAME
8. Number of letters of indebtedness	INCREASED	DECREASED	ABOUT SAME
9. Reenlistment rate	INCREASED	DECREASED	ABOUT SAME
10. Improvement or enhancement of petty officer prestige	INCREASED	DECREASED	ABOUT SAME
11. Operational performance (GIC, gunnery, engineering, etc.)	INCREASED	DECREASED	ABOUT SAME
12. Other (Specify)	INCREASED	DECREASED	ABOUT SAME

8. If ship has undergone an inspection of the type indicated below during past 18 months, please so indicate together with its assigned (if not inspected so state)

ADMIRAL None OR GRADE:

O. R. I. None OR GRADE:

MATERIAL None OR GRADE:

Please indicate briefly your opinion as to the degree the General Order 21 Program may have affected this grade:

9. In attempting to develop a questionnaire of this sort, it is very easy to miss points which, because of some local situation, may be most important. Please indicate briefly below if and/or not you think the G.O. #21 Program is paying dividends and, if so, in what respect. Also, please feel free to add such additional comments in the premises as you may wish.

(CONTINUE ON OTHER SIDE IF DESIRED)



APPENDIX B

COMMENTS IN REPLY TO QUESTION 10


From a heavy combatant: It is felt that General Order 21 has paid dividends to the ---- in terms of operational proficiency, overall morale of the crew, and a definite improvement in the area of petty officer prestige and crew discipline. The crew has shown an interest in the leadership discussions and as evidenced by the record of the ---- they have followed through. A continuing leadership program will be maintained on board.

From a heavy combatant: This command feels that the G.O. 21 program is beginning to pay dividends and will continue to do so at an increasing rate. Our program has been in effect too short a time to show marked results in the operating efficiency of the ship. However, the interest which the men are showing by their participation in the discussion sessions is very encouraging. These sessions are by no means a lecture. At first, they started out rather slowly but many of them are now becoming lively discussions. The petty officers are beginning to see what the program is all about and what's behind it. For the most part they are interested in making a positive contribution. The men agree that the discussions bring about a better understanding of why the Navy operates as it does. Most of the officers are enthusiastic about the program; some do not feel that it is of much value. We should be able to give a more concrete answer a year from now. Right now we are enthusiastic about the program and optimistic about its potential.

From a heavy combatant: Leadership is an intangible thing. Believe that General Order 21 is a good program but it will need to be practiced continually and not via the "one shot" method whereby a ship goes through the steps and guide outline of the Bureau of Naval Personnel and then drops the program as complete. Feel that follow up by the Bureau is required and that type commanders should also push the program and send out guides. The workload on officers attached to ships is so great that if Bureaus and large staffs could do the research and compilation, the program would be more effectively carried through in the fleet.

(NOTE: The above comment was received from the ship reporting completion of a 2-month program!)

From a heavy combatant: Any program of this sort pays dividends. The order has focused attention on the program and given impetus to what otherwise might have been a disorganized effort.



From a heavy combatant: In each command there are varying conditions affecting the conduct and performance of the crew. This ship has just returned from a WestPac cruise; during this period liberty was granted on the basis of "The deserving shall be rewarded." As a result the conduct ashore was outstanding and the subject of many congratulating messages.

From a heavy combatant: The Navy as a whole has been on the upgrade regarding officer and petty officer leadership qualities. This could be contributed to G.O. 21. However more career minded personnel enlisting for the primary purpose of serving in the Navy rather than trying to escape the draft has had a very noticeable effect. The large turnover of personnel keeps the program from being as effective as it could be. Nonrated personnel, particularly low GCT and boots are the source of most of the trouble. In case of boots in the States, many commit violations before they can be squared away. Low GCT and some others have acquired standards and attitudes over 18 years that cannot be changed in a short time.

From a heavy combatant: It is difficult, even deceptive, to attempt to measure the success of such a program as this by most cases, grades on inspections, etc, because of the multitude of interrelated factors which affect these tangible figures. The results of the program may be nearly intangible within a given command, as was undoubtedly the case here. However, if carried out in good faith, the program cannot help but pay dividends. The G.O.21 program was initiated, under the guidance of the executive officer when the ----- commenced her overhaul period in October 1958. All officers were divided into five or six discussion groups, each group headed by a department head. Each group met once a week when time permitted and various subjects were discussed, as I have indicated, including open discussion on problems peculiar to group members. Furthermore, most division officers organized similar groups among their petty officers, using the NavPers Guides, various other materials furnished for use in divisional school, and their own ideas. This program continued until refresher training when, with an unprecedented turnover in personnel, all available time was utilized in training for operational readiness. It seemed to me that the program was characterized by a great deal of lip service and little more. It is not certain that leadership can be taught or learned

because so much depends on whether the student wants to embrace responsibility and exercise authority. This want is not very prevalent among young men coming into the Navy, including officers. However, by exercising or practicing certain principles of responsibility and authority, such as self-discipline, good organization, good training, interest in the welfare of his men, etc., a man may become a good leader without the natural gift, which is very rare anyway. In fact one may not know he is a natural leader.

From a small combatant: The two most important points in making this program effective is to show that it is not a new concept and that it is divorced from the religious connotation. As I see it, the value lies in getting all hands talking and thinking about the subject matter letting them lead themselves to conclusions. Accordingly, the informal approach through the senior PO's is the best. Sailors will more readily accept such a program from fellow bluejackets. If presented by the officers exclusively they are immediately on the defensive.

From a small combatant: This ship is known as arduous sea duty. Out of every 15 month period it spends 6 months in WesPac. After 18 months overseas a man rotates to duty in a Conus based ship - therefore the turnover is terrific. (About 75% after every cruise.) My personal feeling is that if CO's mast is made to mean something our problems are nil. In other words if a PO appears at mast, he should lose his rate. If a man can't conduct himself properly ashore - he shouldn't go ashore. Same if he's a perpetual VD offender. The "liberty risk" system works fine in WesPac - when a man knows he can lose a month's liberty by slapping a Japanese girl - he won't do it. A stern hand gives you fine petty officers - if you don't have them you've had it. The greatest advantage I've seen from the discussion periods (we have them after quarters) is that the officer or PO giving the lecture actually gets closer to his men - hears their problems and gets to know how they think. They in turn get to know him - if he's a good officer or PO - they find it out and vice versa. The "togetherness" idea is the greatest - strong, stern leadership also.

From a small combatant: Definitely feel program is worthwhile and producing desired results. However it is felt that it could be much more effective if it were to receive far greater emphasis in officer training programs



such as NROTC and OCS.


From a small combatant: It is felt that the G.O. 21 program is very effective in continuing the moral training that many of the young men have had with their families. However for those individuals which had little if any moral training at home prior to coming in the Navy the effect of the program is slight.

From a small combatant: A submarine is a small closely knit group. Because of the teamwork required and the usually high feeling of pride of accomplishment the effect of a leadership program is not so readily seen. However, I do feel our participation in the presentations given by the MidFae Leadership Team has moved everybody aboard to reevaluate his duty to himself, the Navy, and his country. Our informal application of these principles is conducted periodically, even at quarters. I feel we cannot push this type of program too hard - or it will lose its intrinsic worth. It must be continuing as there is too great a personnel turnover to complete such a program. On a ship of this size and perhaps even on larger ships the program should be completely informal. I don't feel you can schedule a lecture on General Order 21 at 1400 every Tuesday, etc. Rather you should approach the subject not as a General Order, but as a responsibility of each individual to understand why he is here and why he is doing what he is doing. Once this is accomplished you must instill in the individual a genuine feeling of pride to do his job the very best that he can.

From a small combatant: I emphatically believe that the G.O. 21 program is a complete success. It has done much to improve the overall combat effectiveness of the ----. The ---- received the overall Battle Efficiency "E" for fiscal 1959, also the Engineering "E" with one hashmark.

From a deep draft auxiliary: The ---- is a busy ship, successfully achieving its mission. This success is due in no small part to long hours and busy hours devoted by both the CO and XO. By the end of the day we are tired of paper work. In view of the above I am not willing to accept the additional chore presented by subject paper.

From a deep draft auxiliary: Active has been interpreted to mean formal or as a result of an instruction



or order promulgated locally. To this the answer is No. However, leaders in the Navy are in training on a continuing basis. The subject of leadership training is fine as a letter to CO's etc but appears out of place as a G.O.

From a deep draft auxiliary: Aboard this vessel it is believed that the General Order 21 program is paying some dividends with respect to the stimulation of thinking and awareness of responsibility as appropriate in the petty officer grades. However, it is felt that much more improvement can be made. It is a real problem to stimulate the officers and men into putting forth a more conscientious effort in getting this program "off the ground" and "rolling." This is often the case with the "short term" officers in the junior ranks who are not primarily career minded. During the past year approximately 60 petty officers of the grade E-5, E-6, and E-7 attended a one week PO Leadership school (1/2 day per day) in the -- area. Classes were conducted by the --- --- Career Appraisal Team using the General Order 21 program material. Comments from petty officers who attended have been most satisfying and stimulating. Much improved evidence of good leadership was observed in these same personnel in subsequent weeks. It is felt much more of this type of instruction or discussion is needed, with officers also attending but in separate classes. It is felt in this command that more intensified application of the General Order 21 program is needed throughout all echelons of command. The answer as to how to get it fully started and running smoothly and efficiently, however, is still being evolved.

From a deep draft auxiliary: Leadership cannot be "legislated." I think the program is paying dividends however I deem it a sorry state of affairs when we must teach and preach these factors. The attributes of leadership should become part of each leader thru his experiences and the discipline of the Service. Did the Navy of the twenties and thirties require a program? What about the Royal Navy? What I am saying is this, something is wrong when we must have a program (admittedly a good one) to teach officers and PO factors that once were assumed to be possessed by every military leader. The issue is not being squarely faced. When we do, the UCMJ, the pampering in boot camps, the bowing to the "Mother and Wives Club" will come to an end. We will demand and expect our leaders to produce or face dismissal or reduction. In the meantime, continue the program and derive

what you can from it.

From a deep draft auxiliary: Since inaugurating our leadership program, much interest has been shown by various members of the crew. I don't believe it's possible to make a leader, as such, from attendance to lectures, etc. However, the program has shown to various petty officers those areas where they have become lax and the need of the Navy for good leadership. Also the program has highlighted instances on board this command where leadership was entirely lacking or where the proper approach may have been much more successful. This area

is probably where the most effective training can be accomplished. Also the lectures and class participation have increased the interest shown by members in the every day problems of the ship. This is particularly so in discipline cases.

From a deep draft auxiliary: It is my considered opinion that General Order 21 merely restates ancient tried and true axioms and principles of naval leadership. To most properly organized, trained, and led commands this General Order was unnecessary. High standards of leadership, behavior, and the moral atmosphere of commands have been the goal of the American Navy since John Paul Jones wrote the qualifications of a Naval Officer in a series of Letters and Reports. The ----- has the distinction of being the first Navy ship to win a Battle Efficiency Competition five years in a row, thus winning the Gold "E." This is indicative of a high quality of leadership on the part of five different commanding officers and numerous executive and ship's officers over the past five years (four of which were prior to General Order 21). General Order 21 may serve as a guide to emphasize the importance and the requirements for inspirational, technical, and moral leadership to those young officers who have integrated into the service from programs such as ROTC and OCS who do not have the background and training in naval customs, traditions, and usage. The desired standard of naval leadership can never be accomplished by mere General Orders - it must stem from the top down in actions and examples - and not just by words.

From a deep draft auxiliary: ----- program is in support of the objectives of General Order 21 but uses a somewhat different approach. Personally, I am not one of those that believes that the younger generation is "going

to the dogs." From my observation, our men are better educated, more serious minded, and certainly as ambitious to succeed and anxious to please as in the pre-World War II era of pacifist demonstrations at our leading universities, swallowing goldfish at Harvard, and "over the hill in October" in the Army. I don't think our job is so much to remodel the character of the men we get into the Navy as it is to offer challenges to their abilities. A man who has been given no clear cut responsibilities, who has no sense of accomplishment or pride in his work is a man who will soon become disgruntled and who is ripe to get into trouble. On the other hand, men who are given work which they can recognize as useful and constructive, who are required to meet high professional standards and who are encouraged to advance as rapidly as possible in their profession are men who take pride in themselves and their organization and stay out of trouble. With this philosophy in mind our program, briefly, is as follows: a) Set very high standards for cleanliness, maintenance, operational proficiency, and discipline. b) Organize carefully to insure that responsibilities for every man are clear cut and understood. c) Supervise to insure that standards are met, lost motion eliminated, and goals accomplished on time. This is excellent training of officers and PO's in leadership. d) Train through drills to meet operational proficiency and school to prepare personnel for professional advancement. Our normal routine is a drill each morning and a compulsory school period each afternoon for all hands. e) Inform all hands of future operations, inspections, exercises, etc. f) Justice, swift and sure for offenders - Recognition of outstanding performance. g) Counsel to men who give evidence of difficulty in adjusting to Navy life.

We also have a very fine athletic program, a good general mess, library, etc. - the things which make life in the Navy a bit more comfortable and more enjoyable. But the whole emphasis is on the fact that being a good sailor is a difficult and challenging job - that running our ship right is most important. Sorry to have taken so much time to say only that we are trying to do only what any well run ship should do. But I wouldn't want to give the impression that such success as this ship has enjoyed was due to a series of group discussions on such abstract subjects as "moral values," "leadership," "communism," "democracy," etc. I think this crew is one of the finest I have ever served with. But they were good men to start with. All that we have really done is direct their efforts toward worthwhile goals and allow them to

do the rest.

From an amphibious type: I do not believe General Order 21 has affected this at all; while it points up our moral obligations and responsibilities, I feel the officers of the ----- have the moral fiber that follows General Order 21 without putting it in writing. We receive most of the bad apples of - - - because of our non rotation to WestPac status and as a result our court martial level is higher than it should be with most cases occurring within the first months after a man reports on board. Bureau of Personnel leadership teams do fine until discussion starts, then they become too dogmatic, argue against their teachings and want to demand iron fisted discipline, order everyone to be morally straight.


From an amphibious type: G.O. 21 has only made mandatory what most Naval personnel have been doing for years. It has brought needed attention to and emphasized the need for increased leadership training. This ship has always had an informal program and the overall high morale is one of the prime benefits. Petty officer authority and prestige has been emphasized with excellent results.

From an amphibious type: G.O. 21 is definitely paying dividends but we must be analytical of our problems to the extent that other cures in many cases are also necessary. Leadership can't do it all, in fact, the demands for effective leadership are more easily met when the "climate" or conditions or environment of our overall situation is improved. We have shown regard for this but can progress further.

From an amphibious type: I have had the ship for two months. In that time I have participated in operations generated by the communist aggression in Laos. In addition, the ship was forced to evade five typhoons in five successive weeks. Consequently, I have just begun to find time to look into administrative matters. Insofar as the ----- is concerned, I find that they have a fine leadership program. It is not yet formalized (this matter is now being corrected). You will note that none of our ideas or practices are original. The significance of our program may lie in the fact that concrete benefits have been realized by following well-known leadership principles.

The following facts which bear directly on leadership pertain to this ship: 1) The ship won a red "E" for engineering. 2) The ship won the Assault Boat Insignia signifying excellence in boat handling. 3) The ship won the Squadron Athletic Trophy. 4) The disciplinary record was very good despite an over-extended tour in WestPac. 5) In spite of being delayed in its return from WestPac the morale of the ship's company remained high because all hands understood why the ship had to remain. 6) The ship has never (in the past two years) missed an operational commitment. 7) The ship has tied its training program to its leadership program. Petty officers will be sent to the newly established 2-week Leadership course and have been sent to the 2-week Instructors school at San Diego. All Division Officers have read and studied the Division Officer's Guide and the Watch Officer's Guide. BuPers material has been used but not to the degree considered necessary. Many of our 21 junior officers have taken the Navy correspondence course in Leadership. Lectures are given by the Division Officers and all petty officers in a daily 0800 to 0830 division instruction period. Some of the topics which bear on G.O.21 are: a) How to carry on (sic) in Hong Kong. b) Should you lend money aboard ship? c) Petty officer traits. These talks have been given to every division aboard ship. Lesson plans on these talks are prepared by the speaker and submitted for review by head of department. This type of training has done much to give petty officers self-confidence and ability to express themselves clearly. It has also enhanced their standing in the eyes of the non-rated men. Another way we have tied our training to our leadership program is by having our junior officers and petty officers brief their people before any drill or exercise which has not been done for a considerable period. Following the exercise a critique is held wherein an experienced observer comments on the leadership displayed. 8) The ship's leadership program develops an appreciation of charity and justice. These qualities have been collectively reflected by the crew's voluntary gifts of three radios to Hong Kong refugee children from Communist China, gifts of money to a Japanese school on a small island near Kobe, Japan, and by gifts of money and clothing to Japanese peasants stricken by the vicious typhoon Vera which killed 4500 people. These same qualities of charity and justice are emphasized in handling personnel at all levels, whether at mast or during a bridge watch. The ship's religious program has the usual lay leaders who conduct services. While no

great religious fervor has been observed, I can state from personal observation that language and comportment have certainly changed for the better from shipboard life of 10 years ago. 9) Emphasis has been laid on our sports program which has been intra-ship and inter-ship. The ship won the Squadron Trophy this year. In addition, several softball games were played with Japanese teams during port visits. These games helped break through the language barrier and gave the crew first-hand experience in tolerance and respect for other people's customs. 10) As Commanding Officer I have spoken to the entire crew on several occasions mostly with the thought in mind of keeping our conduct record clean. Evidently they achieved their aim. In addition, I have followed the custom of asking a man to my cabin whenever his birthday occurs. This amounts to an average of a man every day. While it generally follows that I must do most of the talking, the man does have an opportunity to see his captain close up and also gives him a chance to mention any special circumstances affecting his career. 11) The ship has had one lecture (a year ago) by a leadership team based at NAS, North Island. (No teams were available in WestPac during our tour.) On our return to San Diego this week, we plan to enlist all-out aid from this leadership team in our leadership training program.





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